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Abstract
This paper further develops the standard modelling of information exchange bet-
ween ﬁrms in the presence of cost uncertainty. In order to avoid consistency pro-
blems, we replace the normal distribution of the random variables, commonly used
because of its convenient mathematical properties, by an alternative one, namely a
non-symmetrically distributed random variable with a binomial positive outcome.
This leads to new results concerning ﬁrms’ information-disclosure policy: Conﬁr-
ming the empirical evidence and in contrast to the existing literature, we show that
in Cournot markets ﬁrms never exchange their private information and in Bertrand
markets only for very steep demand functions.
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1 Introduction
The role of uncertainty and the function of information in oligopolistic markets have
been ﬁelds of major interest in recent years in Industrial Organisation research. In
addition to strategic parameters as capacity, location, advertising or R&D invest-
ments which all decisively inﬂuence competition because of the commitment-eﬀect
of sunk costs (see e.g. Shy 1995 or Tirole 1988) one also has to consider the more
subtle entrepreneurial strategies concerning the information-disclosure policy. Tal-
king to managers of industrial ﬁrms or studying company press releases and annual
reports, one ﬁnds a broad unanimity that there is a great readiness to reveal infor-
mation on sales or demand data, but a persevering silence about the technologies
applied or ﬁrms’ cost structures. The same information policy pattern can be ob-
served in the activities of existing trade associations. It is therefore an important
issue to analyse the basic rationale hidden behind these decisions.
For this reason, ever since the 1970s, numerous articles on information sharing in
oligopoly have been written. Pioneers in this ﬁeld are Basar, Ho (1974), Ponssard
(1979) and Novshek, Sonnenschein (1982). Two main directions of research have
evolved: Models analysing demand uncertainty (cf. for example Clarke 1983, Vives
1984, Gal-Or 1985, Sakai 1986, Kirby 1988, Sakai, Yamato 1989, Hviid 1989) and
models analysing unit-costs uncertainty (cf. for example Fried 1984, Li 1985, Gal-
Or 1986, Shapiro 1986, Hornig, Stadler 2000). The articles of Sakai (1990, 1991),
Jin (1992) and especially Raith (1996) present general models that contain most of
the results obtained in the cited papers as special cases.1
In general, the authors dealing with demand uncertainty show that Cournot ﬁrms
producing very close substitutes do not exchange their information, whereas for not
very close substitutes and for the whole range of complementary goods, disclosure is
always favourable. In contrast, under Bertrand competition, ﬁrms producing substi-
tutes and not very close complements, generally disclose their private information,
otherwise they do not. All these models which analyse demand uncertainty have
in common that there is uncertainty regarding the stochastic intercept of linear
demand functions. This uncertainty is modelled by assuming that the random va-
riable is normally distributed. This is done mainly for technical reasons concerning
1 Recently, Vives (1999, ch. 8) provides a non-formal and comprehensive overview and Stadler,
Hornig (2000) show the eﬀects of information sharing in a simple general model.2
the mathematics of the models. Although the normal distribution is deﬁned over
the range −∞ to +∞, the authors implicitly assume the realisations of the random
variable to be “very close” to the expected intercept in order to guarantee that the
non-negativity constraint of the intercept of the demand function is fulﬁlled. Howe-
ver, this obviously contradicts the properties of the normal distribution function,
creating consistency problems and a logical break in the analysis.2 Using a distribu-
tion function that guarantees non-negativity Hornig (2000b, 2003, p. 111 ﬀ.) solves
this drawback. Further, as the random variables do not necessarily have to be sym-
metrically distributed - as is implicitly assumed by using the normal distribution -,
by assuming a random variable with two possible (positive) realisations that do not
need to be equally likely, the results of the existing literature can be conﬁrmed (for
the case of a symmetric distribution). However, for a non-symmetric distribution of
the random variable, the ﬁrms will disclose their information for a much wider range
of parameter constellations in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium than they would do
in situations with a symmetric probability distribution.
In contrast to the demand uncertainty setup, in the normal distribution case with
cost uncertainty and substitutive goods, Cournot ﬁrms exchange the private infor-
mation about their own unit costs in the production process (cf. Fried 1984, Li
1985, Gal-Or 1986, Shapiro 1986), while Bertrand ﬁrms are better oﬀ by keeping it
secret (cf. Gal-Or 1986, Hornig, Stadler 2000, Jin 2000). Firms producing comple-
mentary goods do not exchange private cost information with Cournot competition,
while Bertrand ﬁrms do (cf. Raith 1996).
With this knowledge, the aim of this paper is to investigate the eﬀects of chan-
ging the distributional properties of the unit-costs random variable. As in the setup
with demand uncertainty, nearly all the models in the existing literature analy-
sing unit-costs uncertainty have in common that this uncertainty is modelled by
2 If the authors at all mention this potential consistency problem their typical justiﬁcations are:
The probability of the existence of negative realisations may be reduced by an appropriate
choice of the variances of the random variables (Vives 1984, p. 77), which however not really
reduces the problem. Other autors like Li (1985, p. 523), Kirby (1988, p. 140) or Cason (1994,
p. 7) argue that non-negativity could technically be imposed by assuming combinations of beta-
and Binomial distribution or gamma- and Poisson distribution - however only with a poorer
information and signal structure -, or make reference to Ericson (1969) for further distributional
combinations.3
assuming a normally distributed random variable.3 Therefore, again the mentio-
ned non-negativity and consistency problems arise. In this paper, however, we will
model a more general information and signal structure and assume unit costs as
a random variable with two possible (positive) realisations that do not have to
be equally probable. Thus, we will use a distributional form as in Hornig (2000a,
2000b) and therefore will be able to look for parallels or diﬀerences, on the one side
to the existing literature using the normal distribution and on the other side, to the
eﬀects of the distributional choice in the demand uncertainty setup.
The following section of the paper presents the assumptions and the information
structure of the model. Section 3 analyses the output-setting and information-
exchange decisions as well as the pricing and information-exchange decisions, res-
pectively. This is done for both duopolists in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium and
the results are compared with the ones obtained in models which assume a normal
distribution. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
The market structure is comprised of two risk-neutral and proﬁt-maximising ﬁrms
i,j = 1,2, producing diﬀerentiated goods. The (inverse) demand functions for the
two products are given by
pi (qi,qj) = α − β (qi − gqj) , i,j = 1,2, i 6= j (1)
with α,β > 0, 0 < |g| < 1 as parameters, pi as the price of ﬁrm i and qi, qj the
respective outputs of both duopolists.4 For g > 0 the goods are characterised as
substitutes, whereas for negative values of the substitutability parameter g, the
ﬁrms produce complements and for g = 0 independent goods.
3 Shapiro (1986) uses more general assumptions concerning the probability distributions so that in
contrast to most authors not only the normal distribution is included. Within a less general in-
formation and signal structure Stadler (2001) substitutes the normal with a uniform distribution
of unit costs and conﬁrms the established results.
4 This demand function results from an appropriate quadratic utility function of the type





1 + 2gq1q2 + q2
2
￿
of a representative consumer with q0 indicating the consumed quantity of the numéraire good.4
In order to model cost uncertainty, the unit costs c are assumed to be stochastic.
In contrast to the existing literature which uses the normal distribution (see the
articles listed in the introduction), this paper analyses the case of a non-symmetric
distribution. Speciﬁcally, there are two states unit costs may take on: They can be
high or low represented by the index k = H,L. Thus, high unit costs are denoted
by the parameter value cH ∈ [0,α) and low unit costs by cL = hcH, with 0 ≤ h ≤ 1.
As the parameter h indicates the ratio between the two possible unit-costs levels, it
may also be labelled as the unit-costs variability parameter.5 Both ﬁrms know that
low or high unit costs occur with the probabilities P(cL) = κ and P(cH) = 1 − κ,
respectively.
Before the duopolists start competing, they independently observe a private signal
sil about the stochastic common unit costs ck ∈ {cL;cH} with the index l = H,L
representing the the level of unit costs the signal is indicating. Thus, the signal
may indicate high (sH) or low unit costs (sL), i.e. sil ∈ {sL,sH}.6 The relationship
between the private signal sil and the realised unit-costs level (represented by ck)
is assumed to be determined by the following conditional probabilities P(sil|ck)




cL ξ 1 − ξ
ck cH 1 − ξ ξ
Table 1: Conditional probabilities P(sil|ck).
Consequently, the quality of the signal improves with an increasing probability ξ.
The private signals sil can also be viewed as the ﬁrms’ a priori beliefs about the
unit-costs level. These are diﬀerent because in the modelled uncertainty situation,
the information source or interpretation method may diﬀer. To ensure that the
ﬁrms will actually consider cL (cH) most probable after having received the signal
sL (sH), we assume 0.5 ≤ ξ ≤ 1.7 From the conditional probabilities in Table 1, it
5 The special case of a deterministic scenario is given by h = 1.
6 In this context, “independently” means that in spite of an identical value of the realised unit
costs ck for both duopolists, one ﬁrm may observe a private signal indicating high and the other
a signal for low unit costs.5
follows that the problem of incomplete information becomes less severe due to the
additional signal sil, but does not completely disappear.
With incomplete information, the ﬁrms have the possibility of mutually exchanging
their private unit-costs information. They can do this before they start engaging in
competition in the goods market. To exclude the possibility of strategic information
exchange as modeled for example by Crawford, Sobel (1982) or Okuno-Fujiwara et
al. (1990) and in order to be better able to compare the results with the mains-
tream literature, we stay as close as possible to the assumptions made there. For
this reason, the ﬁrms are assumed to choose their exchange strategies before recei-
ving their private signals. For this purpose, they enter into a binding agreement
of either disclosing their private unit-costs information or keeping it to themselves.
As is standard in the literature, a trustee or a trade association will guarantee this
information exchange agreement.
If the two competitors commit themselves to complete disclosure, the amount of
information concerning the expected unit-costs level both ﬁrms possess increases
from only containing their own private information (zi = {si}, i = 1,2 ) before
exchange, to containing both signals (zi = {si,sj}, zi = zj, i 6= j) afterwards. When
subsequently competing on the commodity market, they can then make use of this
larger information set. Of course, for the case of no disclosure, the information level
remains unchanged: zi = {si}, i = 1,2. Basically, the ﬁrms will always exchange
their private information if they expect higher proﬁts as a result of less intensive
competition.8
To summarise, in this two stage game of incomplete information, the time and
information structure of the ﬁrms results as (cf. also Figure 1):
I. On the ﬁrst stage the competitors simultaneously decide about their informa-
tion exchange policy:
7 This assumption implies no loss of generality because the probability ξ is exogenous and common
knowledge to both ﬁrms. For a value ξ < 0.5 they just would presume the opposite unit-costs
level more probable, i.e. for the signal sL (sH) they would expect high (low) unit costs.
8 However, it should be noted that even when ﬁrms mutually exchange information, they do not
collude in the classical sense, as they maximise their proﬁts and set their output levels or prices
independently.6
1. First of all, the ﬁrms commit to disclose their private unit costs infor-
mation completely or not at all.
2. Player “nature” determines the unit-costs realisations cH and cL, while
the ﬁrms only know the corresponding probabilities P(cL) = κ and
P(cH) = 1 − κ.
3. Every ﬁrm observes a private signal si about the unit-costs level, given
the conditional probabilities P(sL|cL) = P(sH|cH) = ξ and P(sL|cH) =
P(sH|cL) = 1 − ξ as common knowledge.
4. Firms disclose their private information or not, depending on the com-
mitment of stage I.1.
II. On the second stage, competing in the commodity market, ﬁrms set their
output quantities qi or commodity prices pi depending on their information
sets zi which are zi = {si} in case of complete disclosure or zi = {si,sj} in
case of no disclosure.

























Figure 1: Time and information structure of the model.
3 Bayesian Nash Equilibria
In this section we will analyse the two basic market equilibria of Industrial Organisa-
tion: the Cournot equilibria with quantity competition and the Bertrand equilibria
with price competition. In the course of this analysis, these equilibria will be derived7
by the standard backward induction method, depending on the existing information
set available to the ﬁrms.
3.1 Bayesian Nash Equilibria of Quantities
In this two-stage model, the ﬁrms have two decision parameters by which they
maximise their expected proﬁts: Formally, the strategies of the two Cournot ﬁrms
in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium consist of the output levels they produce and the
decision on whether to exchange information or not. Therefore, the ﬁrms choose
their respective output levels depending on their information sets zi, i = 1,2, in
order to maximise expected proﬁts. With the demand function (1) and given the









= E{{[α − β (qi + gqj) − c]qi}|zi} (2)
with the index C indicating Cournot competition and E as the expected value

















The ﬁrms are symmetric in all aspects with the exception of their information
set. Consequently, if the information set is identical for both, they also behave




k for the signal sik, indicating the state of unit costs k (k = L,H).
Inserting the reaction function (3) into the proﬁt function (2) leads to the following
expected proﬁt of ﬁrm i in reduced form which depends on the available information



















= −2β < 0. An
asterisk always symbolises equilibrium values.8
If instead of only one given information set zi we consider all possible information
sets and if we weight the corresponding expected proﬁts of ﬁrm i in reduced form
(4) with their probabilities P(zi) there results the following ex ante expected proﬁt

















Using (5), the expected equilibrium proﬁts can be determined depending on the
exchange behaviour. As is standard in the existing information-exchange literature,
we will derive the incentives to share the private information in a comparative
static manner, analysing the two extreme cases of “no information exchange” and
“complete information exchange”. Note, that due to the symmetry between the ﬁrms,
if it is optimal for one ﬁrm to reveal (conceal) its private signal, it is optimal for
the other ﬁrm to also do so. Therefore, we can exclude asymmetric information-
exchange behaviour of the ﬁrms in equilibrium.
3.1.1 No Information Exchange
If the competitors do not exchange their private information, the information set of
ﬁrm i only consists of the own private signal about the unit-costs level (zi = {si}).
Because of the assumption ξ ≥ 0.5 and no additional information from the compe-
titor, ﬁrm i will infer cl (l = L,H) from sil and will choose the equilibrium output
ql.
Using the respective probabilities and considering that ﬁrm j may observe a private
signal indicating a high (sjH) or a low unit-costs level (sjL), from the reaction






α − gβ [P(sL ∧ sL)qL + P(sL ∧ sH)qH]
−P(cL ∧ sL)cL − P(cH ∧ sL)cH
￿
(6)






α − gβ [P(sH ∧ sL)qL + P(sH ∧ sH)qH]
−P(cL ∧ sH)cL − P(cH ∧ sH)cH
￿
(7)
Taking into account that cL = hcH, these equations (6) and (7) can be combined




α − cH [hP(cL ∧ sL) + P(cH ∧ sL)]




2P(sL) + gP(sL ∧ sL) gP(sL ∧ sH)






Using the probabilities, as derived in the Appendix, the equation system (8) solves










α{2ξ − (1 − 2ξ)[gξ − (2 + g)κ]}
−cH {hκξ [2(κ + ξ − 2κξ) + g (κ + 2ξ − 2κξ − 1)]











α{4κξ − (κ + ξ − 1)[2 + g (1 − 2ξ)]}
−cH
n
hκ(1 − ξ){2[1 − ξ − κ(1 − 2ξ)] + g(1 − κ)(1 − 2ξ)}
+(1 − κ)ξ [2(1 − ξ) − (2 + g)κ(1 − 2ξ)]
o￿
(10)
With the ex ante expected proﬁt in reduced form (5), the equilibrium outputs
(9), (10) and the corresponding probabilities given in the Appendix, in the no-
10 For interested readers, an extensive mathematical appendix with derivations of all the results
stated in the text is available from the author upon request.10



















(2 + g)κ(1 − κ)(1 − 2ξ)




[1 − ξ − κ(1 − 2ξ)]
n
α{2ξ − (1 − 2ξ)[gξ − (2 + g)κ]}
−cH {hκξ [2(κ + ξ − 2κξ) + g(κ + 2ξ − 2κξ − 1)]
+(1 − κ)(1 − ξ)[2ξ + (2 + g)κ(1 − 2ξ)]}
o2
+(κ + ξ − 2κξ)
￿
α{4κξ − (κ + ξ − 1)[2 + g (1 − 2ξ)]}
−cH
n
hκ(1 − ξ){2[1 − ξ − κ(1 − 2ξ)] + g (1 − κ)(1 − 2ξ)}
+(1 − κ)ξ [2(1 − ξ) − (2 + g)κ(1 − 2ξ)]
o￿2)
(11)
As can be seen from equation (11), the expected proﬁt in the no-information-sharing
Cournot equilibrium depends on the demand parameters α, β and g, on the unit-
costs variability h, on the unit-costs level cH as well as on the probabilities κ and
ξ.
3.1.2 Complete Information Exchange
If the ﬁrms disclose their information completely, the information set of both is
identical and consists of the two private unit-costs signals: zi = {si,sj}, i = 1,2,




{α − gβqj (si,sj) − E[c|(si ∧ sj)]} (12)
As the ﬁrms are symmetric, with identical information sets they consequently pro-
duce the identical equilibrium output qi (si,sj) = qj (si,sj) =: q (si,sj). This implies
for equation (12):
11 The index NN characterises the situation when neither of the two ﬁrms discloses any infor-
mation.11
q(si,sj) =
α − E[c|(si ∧ sj)]
(2 + g)β
(13)
With the probabilities κ and ξ from Table 1 and Bayes’ theorem, the three possible
signal combinations (sL,sL), (sL,sH) and (sH,sH) lead to the three corresponding












κξ2 + (1 − κ)(1 − ξ)
2￿ (14)
qLH =















2 + (1 − κ)ξ2￿ (16)
Using the ex ante expected proﬁt in reduced form (5), the equilibrium output levels
(14) to (16) and the corresponding probabilities derived in the Appendix, the expec-













κξ2 + (1 − κ)(1 − ξ)
2￿￿
κ(1 − ξ)
















2 + (1 − κ)(1 − ξ)
2￿￿2
+2ξ (1 − ξ)
￿
κξ
2 + (1 − κ)(1 − ξ)
2￿￿
κ(1 − ξ)




















2 + (1 − κ)ξ
2￿￿2o
(17)
Thus, the expected proﬁt in the complete-information-sharing Cournot equilibrium
depends on the same parameters as in the no-exchange case.
12 The index RR characterises the situation when both ﬁrms completely reveal their private
information.12
3.1.3 Which Information-Exchange Strategy Do Cournot Firms
Choose?
The decision criterion for the proﬁt-maximising ﬁrms is the diﬀerence in the respec-


















. This reﬂects the
ﬁrm’s rationale that it wants to choose the strategy that bears the highest possible
expected proﬁt. For a positive proﬁt diﬀerence, it will exchange its private informa-
tion, for a negative it will not. In order to obtain the proﬁt-diﬀerence function we
deﬁne the relative importance of unit costs in the Cournot case as fC :=
cH
α . Then,


























As the sign of the expected proﬁt diﬀerence (18) cannot be analytically identiﬁed
directly, instead of the explicit equational form we use this abbreviated functional
form. Both expected proﬁts (11) and (17) depend on the exogenous demand para-
meters α, β and g, on the given cost parameters h and fC as well as on the (equally
exogenous) probabilities κ and ξ. This also holds for the diﬀerence in expected pro-
ﬁts (18). However, the sign of the proﬁt diﬀerence only depends on the substitution
parameter g, on the unit-costs variability h, on the relative unit-costs importance
fC, and on the probabilities κ and ξ. By contrast, the other demand parameters,
i.e. the absolute demand level α and the slope parameter β, have no inﬂuence on
the decision as they only function as shift parameters.
In addition to these common statements about the relevance of the various parame-
ters of the model, numerical analysis of this Cournot situation leads to the general
conclusion that in an environment of unit-costs uncertainty, quantity-setting ﬁrms
will never disclose their private information. Figure 2 shows a graphical visualisation






depending on the probabilities κ
and ξ. The relief of the expected proﬁt diﬀerence “landscape”, as shown in Figure
2, is the typical one. The shape of this landscape does not diﬀer fundamentally if
any of the parameters fC, g or h changes. As one would expect, under the highest
decision uncertainty (κ = 0.5 and ξ = 0.5) the expected-proﬁt diﬀerence shows up





























to exchange information is highest, although the incentive does not suﬃce as the






are still above the information-






. The highest expected losses can be observed
when ξ is highest, and simultaneously κ is close to one or zero. The reason is that
a high probability ξ represents a high signal quality. In this case of very good own
information, additional information by the rival is less attractive. Further, κ close
to one or zero means that the realisation of unit costs is almost certainly known.
Hence, with these parameter constellations, information exchange becomes even
more unattractive.
Additionally, there is a monotonous relationship between the substitutability para-
meter g and the expected proﬁt diﬀerence: The closer substitutes the goods become,
i.e. the higher g is, the less desirable is information exchange. Besides, it can be
seen that the higher the unit-costs variability h is, the more the expected-proﬁt dif-
ference landscape is ﬂattened. Finally, the higher the relative unit-costs importance
fC is, the more the landscape tilts down towards κ = 1.
In models using the normal distribution (cf. the articles cited above), Cournot ﬁrms
producing substitutes deliberately exchange their private cost information, whereas
for complementary goods, disclosure is never favourable. Thus, in contrast to the
existing literature, with unit costs modelled as a random variable with a binomial
outcome, not even ﬁrms producing substitutive goods will be willing to disclose
private information.14
3.2 Bayesian Nash Equilibria of Prices
The case of Bertrand competition between the two ﬁrms will be analysed in a
similar way. Again, there are two decision parameters of the ﬁrms: The Bertrand
equilibria consist of the prices the competitors demand and the decision on whether
to exchange the private unit-costs information or not. Therefore, on the second stage
of the game the ﬁrms choose their respective prices depending on their information
sets zi, i = 1,2, (determined on the ﬁrst stage) in order to maximise expected
proﬁts. With the (inverse) demand functions (1), the demand functions for the
price-setting ﬁrms are
qi (pi,pj) = a − b(pi − gpj) , i,j = 1,2 (19)
with a := α
(1+g)β and b := 1
(1−g2)β as positive parameters. Given the information set









= E{{(pi − c)[a − b(pi − gpj)]}|zi} , (20)
where the index B indicates Bertrand competition. Maximising the expected proﬁt






{a + b[gE(pj |zi) + E(c|zi)]} (21)
The ﬁrms are symmetric in all aspects with the exception of their respective private
signals si. Consequently, if these private signals imply for both competitors identical
information sets zi, they also behave symmetrically in the equilibrium. This means
that in the case of no disclosure after having observed a private signal sil which




l. Accordingly, in the case of complete information exchange corresponding





Inserting the reaction function (21) into the expected proﬁt function (20), leads to
the following reduced form expected proﬁt of ﬁrm i, which depends on the available







= −2b < 0.15












i (zi) − E(c|zi)]
2 (22)
Weighting these ex ante expected proﬁts (22) by their probabilities and aggregating

















Using this proﬁt function, the ex ante expected equilibrium proﬁts can be deter-
mined depending on the exchange behaviour. Again and as in the case of Cournot
competition, we will derive the incentives to share the private information in a
comparative static manner, analysing only the two extreme cases of “no informa-
tion exchange” and “complete information exchange”.
3.2.1 No Information Exchange
If the ﬁrms do not exchange their private information, each information set only
consists of the own private signal about the level of unit costs (zi = {si}). As ξ ≥ 0.5,
with no additional information from the competitor, ﬁrm i will infer cl, l = H,L
from sil and will choose the equilibrium price pk.
Using the corresponding probabilities and the reaction function (21) of ﬁrm i, we
respectively obtain for the private signal siL, indicating a low, and for siH, indicating







g [P(sL ∧ sL)pL + P(sL ∧ sH)pH]









g [P(sH ∧ sL)pL + P(sH ∧ sH)pH]
+P(cL ∧ sH)cL + P(cH ∧ sH)cH
￿o
(25)16
Equations (24) and (25) can be combined to the equation system:
 
a
b + cH [hP(cL ∧ sL) + P(cH ∧ sL)]
a




2P(sL) − gP(sL ∧ sL) −gP(sL ∧ sH)






Inserting the probabilities, as derived in the Appendix, allows us to solve for the










gξ (1 − ξ){a + bcH [hκ(1 − ξ) + (1 − κ)ξ]}
+[(2 − g)κ(1 − 2ξ) + ξ (2 − gξ)]
n











gξ (1 − ξ)
n




2(κ + ξ − 2κξ − 1) + g
￿
(1 − ξ)




a + bcH {ξ + κ[h − (1 + h)ξ]}
o￿
(28)
Using the ex ante expected equilibrium proﬁt in reduced form (23), the equilibrium
prices (27) and (28) and the corresponding probabilities given in the Appendix, the




















gξ (1 − ξ){a + bcH [hκ(1 − ξ) + (1 − κ)ξ]}17
+[(2 − g)κ(1 − 2ξ) + ξ (2 − gξ)]
·
n
a + bcH {1 − ξ + κ[(1 + h)ξ − 1]}
o￿
−
hκξ + (1 − κ)(1 − ξ)
κξ + (1 − κ)(1 − ξ)
cH
)2










gξ (1 − ξ)
n




2(κ + ξ − 2κξ − 1) + g
￿
(1 − ξ)




a + bcH {ξ + κ[h − (1 + h)ξ]}
o￿
−
hκ(1 − ξ) + (1 − κ)ξ






As can be seen from equation (29), the expected proﬁt depends on the demand
parameters a, b and g, on the unit-costs variability h, on the unit-costs level cH, as
well as on the probabilities κ and ξ.
3.2.2 Complete Information Exchange
Just as in the Cournot case, if the ﬁrms disclose their information completely, the
information sets of both are identical and consist of the two private unit-costs
signals: zi = {si,sj}, i = 1,2, i 6= j. The optimality condition (21) of ﬁrm i can





a + b{gpj (si,sj) + E[c|(si ∧ sj)]}
o
(30)
With symmetric ﬁrms, they consequently choose the identical equilibrium price
pi (si,sj) = pj (si,sj) =: p(si,sj). From equation (30) this implies:
p(si,sj) =
a + bE[c|(si ∧ sj)]
(2 − g)b
(31)18
Using the probabilities in Table 1 and Bayes’ theorem, the three possible signal













κξ2 + (1 − κ)(1 − ξ)
2￿ (32)
pLH =















2 + (1 − κ)ξ2￿ (34)
With the ex ante expected equilibrium proﬁt in reduced form (23), the equilibrium
prices (32) to (34) and the corresponding probabilities derived in the Appendix,































+2ξ (1 − ξ)
￿
a + bcH [1 − (1 − h)κ]
(2 − g)b



























Thus, the ex ante expected proﬁt (35) depends on the same parameters as in the
no-information-exchange case.19
3.2.3 Which Information-Exchange Strategy Do Bertrand Firms
Choose?
Whether proﬁt-maximising Bertrand ﬁrms disclose their information or not depends



















. Of course, as in the Cournot case, the rivals will exchange their private
unit-costs information for a positive proﬁt diﬀerence, for a negative diﬀerence they
will not. With the no-exchange proﬁt equation (29) and the complete-exchange














As the sign of this ex ante expected proﬁt diﬀerence (36) cannot be unambiguously
determined analytically again we will argue on the base of numerical analysis in or-
der to determine - depending on the market conditions - which information-exchange
decisions both competitors will make.
In order to facilitate the interpretation of the numerical results we deﬁne (analogi-
cally to the Cournot case above) a parameter fB :=
cH
a of the relative importance
of unit costs in the Bertrand case with fB ∈ [0,1) and B indicating Bertrand com-
petition. Considering this and the ex ante expected ﬁrm proﬁts (29) and (35) the


















As both expected proﬁts (29) and (35) depend on the absolute demand level a, on
the demand slope parameter b, on the substitutability parameter g, on the unit-
costs variability h, on the unit-costs importance fB, and on the probabilities κ and
ξ which are all exogenous, the same also holds for the diﬀerence in expected proﬁts
(37). In contrast to the Cournot case treated above, the sign of the proﬁt diﬀerence
depends on all these parameters, too.
Numerical simulations of the ex ante expected proﬁt diﬀerence (37) lead to the
following decision rules, shown graphically in Figures 3 to 5. These ﬁgures represent



































competition and a not very high demand slope parameter b.
ξ. Figure 3 shows the whole plot of the expected proﬁt diﬀerence which is negative











and explicitly show the negative regions only.
Consequently, the ﬂat areas represent parameter combinations with positive, the
deepenings combinations with negative proﬁt diﬀerences.
An overall view on the results of the numerical analysis of the information-exchange
situation with price competition leads to the general conclusion that the ﬁrms scar-
cely ever reveal their private unit-costs information. The ex ante expected proﬁt
diﬀerence (37) is negative for nearly all possible parameter combinations (cf. Figure
3 for a typical visualisation of the ex ante expected proﬁt diﬀerences). Like in the
case of quantity competition above a decision uncertainty eﬀect is observed: As can
be seen in Figure 3 the relative losses of the competitors from information exchange
again are lowest in the case of highest decision uncertainty (κ = 0,5, ξ = 0,5).
However, there may be identiﬁed parameter combinations that lead to positive ex
ante expected proﬁt diﬀerences (cf. Figure 4 in the case of complete substitutes
and Figure 5 in the case of complete complements), which implies complete infor-
mation exchange by the competitors. In general, these regions only occur for very
high values of the demand parameter b, i.e. for a very steep slope of the underlying
demand function. This reﬂects the fact that with a steep demand function, small





























competition in the case of perfect substitutes, a very high demand
slope parameter b and high variabiliy of unit costs (i.e. low h).
duce unit-costs uncertainty via information exchange in order to avoid price settings
which prove to be suboptiomal ex post. This demand-slope eﬀect even dominates
the decision-uncertainty eﬀect. For lower values of b, the expected proﬁt diﬀerence
landscape exhibits relief shapes as in Figure 3 (independent of the values of the
parameters a, fB, g and h).
In the case of a very high parameter value b, i.e. in a situation which may be
characterised by complete information exchange, it appears that independent of the
substitutability of the goods an increasing relative importance of unit costs (i.e. an
increasing value of fB) induces a shrinking region of complete information exchange.
This eﬀect particularly occurs in presence of a low unit costs variability, i.e. a high
value of h. Additionally, even on its own a decreasing unit costs variability is able to
drastically reduce the parameter region of complete information exchange. In this
context, there can be shown for the case of high values of h and close substitutes
no parameter combination can exist that leads to complete information exchange
as an optimal ﬁrm strategy.
In the existing literature which uses the normal distribution, Bertrand ﬁrms always
disclose their private unit-costs information. In the setup of unit costs as a random
variable with a binomial outcome as modelled here the ﬁrms only consider infor-





























competition in the case of complete complements, a very high de-
mand slope parameter b and high variabiliy of unit costs (i.e. low
h).
case, we again observe a concordance between the setup using the normal distribu-
tion and the setup of unit costs as a random variable with a binomial outcome with
respect to the optimal information exchange decisions of the ﬁrms.
4 Concluding Remarks
Starting from the non-negativity and consistency problems of the normal-distribu-
tion assumption in the standard modelling of the existing literature which deals
with information exchange between ﬁrms in the presence of unit-costs uncertainty,
this paper provides an alternative approach. We have replaced the normal distribu-
tion of the random variables and signals, commonly used because of its convenient
mathematical properties, by a non-symmetrically distributed random variable with
a binomial positive outcome. Hence, the model here solves two drawbacks of the
existing literature concerning information exchange by assuming a non-symmetric
distribution in which only positive realisations of the random variable are allowed.
In contrast to the existing literature using the normal distribution, we found that
in Cournot markets ﬁrms never exchange their private unit-costs information and23
in Bertrand markets only for a very steep demand. Thus, in a world with price
competition and substitutive goods, the observed behaviour of managers and trade
associations of not disclosing unit-costs information can be explained for almost
all theoretically thinkable situations. Therefore, we can further reinforce Stadler’s
(2001) message: “Talk is Silver, Silence is Golden.” These new results are driven
by the alternative distributional approach presented here. The observed decision-
uncertainty eﬀect is generally not strong enough so as to induce information re-
velation by the ﬁrms. The only pro-disclosure force in our model that is powerful
enough to prevail stems from the demand-slope eﬀect.
While the inverse symmetric results of Cournot relative to Bertrand competition
information-exchange behaviour - a well established fact in the information-exchange
literature - can also be observed in our distributional setup for the case of demand
uncertainty (cf. Hornig 2000a, 2000b), it vanishes for the case of cost uncertainty
here.
Nevertheless, for the practically relevant situation of price competition with sub-
stitutive goods, the presented model provides further support for the robustness of
the theoretical equilibrium result as well as the empirical observation, both showing
no information sharing. With this in mind, our non-symmetric distribution setup
ﬁlls another gap in the research program Novshek (1996, p. 14 f.) propagates in
saying: “Since there can be no hope of ﬁnding a general model that provides unam-
biguous policy implications, the alternative is to expand the set of ‘boxes’ covered
so as to create a better ﬁt with the real markets of concern to practitioners.” Our
result of no disclosure under the empirically relevant market conditions also may
weaken the apprehensions of authors like Neumann (2000, p. 128 ﬀ.), who criticise
the collusion-encouraging eﬀects of information-sharing agreements from the point
of view of anti-trust policy.24
Appendix
From Table 1 and κ, indicating the probability of low unit-costs realisations, it is
possible to derive the following probabilities:
P(cL ∧ sL) = κξ (A.1)
P(cH ∧ sL) = (1 − κ)(1 − ξ) (A.2)
P(cL ∧ sH) = κ(1 − ξ) (A.3)
P(cH ∧ sH) = (1 − κ)ξ (A.4)
P(sL) = κξ + (1 − κ)(1 − ξ) (A.5)
P(sH) = κ(1 − ξ) + (1 − κ)ξ (A.6)
P(sL ∧ sL) = κξ
2 + (1 − κ)(1 − ξ)
2 (A.7)
P(sL ∧ sH) = ξ (1 − ξ) (A.8)
P(sH ∧ sL) = ξ (1 − ξ) (A.9)
P(sH ∧ sH) = κ(1 − ξ)
2 + (1 − κ)ξ
2 (A.10)25
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